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YOUR PLACE OR MINE: THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF CHOICE-OF-
LAW/FORUM CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES CONTRACTS
I.  INTRODUCTION
A preliminary issue in controversies involving international con-
tracts—but one that is often critical to the outcome of such dis-
putes—is that of determining which country’s laws will govern a
transaction.  In an effort to resolve this question before it arises, par-
ties have increasingly begun to incorporate choice-of-law (COL)
clauses (identifying which country’s laws will obtain to the contract),
choice-of-forum (COF) clauses (identifying which country’s courts
will be permitted to hear contractual disputes), and choice-of-
procedure (COP) clauses (stipulating, for example, that all disputes
arising under the contract shall be resolved by arbitration) into their
contracts.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted over twenty-five
years ago, the elimination of such uncertainties “is an indispensable
element in international trade, commerce, and contracting.”1
Because the Securities Act of 19332 (Securities Act) and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 19343 (Exchange Act) expressly contain an-
tiwaiver provisions,4 however, a court is faced with a dilemma when
an investor comes before it who has entered into an international se-
curities contract stipulating, say, English laws and English courts.
Does agreeing to be bound by foreign law in a foreign court consti-
tute waiving federal securities law?  Can an investor be made to indi-
rectly waive his rights and protections under U.S. securities law by
agreeing to non-U.S. COL and COF clauses when to do so directly
1. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (1994).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (1994).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1994); see also infra notes 24-25 and ac-
companying text.
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would certainly violate federal securities law?  Conversely, should a
party to an international contract be allowed to defeat the non-U.S.
COL and COF clauses to which he had originally agreed simply by
bringing a claim under U.S. securities law?
In a string of appellate cases involving Lloyd’s of London
(Lloyd’s),5 a British insurance market, the courts have wrestled with
these questions (the Lloyd’s cases).6  Relying on the analysis of the
United States Supreme Court in four cases involving COL and COF
clauses in international contracts,7 the Second,8 Fourth,9 Fifth,10
Sixth,11 Seventh,12 and Tenth13 Circuits have ultimately come to the
conclusion that such clauses do not contravene U.S. securities law
and therefore should be enforceable.  To date, only the Ninth Circuit,
a lone holdout, has found that such clauses are unenforceable as a
violation of federal law;14 significantly, however, the Ninth Circuit has
recently ordered this case be reheard en banc.15
After five years of much tossing and turning, the splits among
the circuits would thus seem to finally be resolving themselves as
opinions begin to converge.  Appearances, however, can be deceiv-
ing.  While a consensus may be forming that the COL and COF
5. “Lloyd’s of London” is a generic appellation for the insurance market that is run by
Corporation of Lloyd’s a/k/a Society and Council of Lloyd’s d/b/a Committee of Lloyd’s.  See
Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 958 n.1, reh’g en banc denied, 121 F.3d 614 (5th Cir.
1997); Stamm v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, No. 96 CIV 5158(SAS), 1997 WL 438773, at *1 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1997); infra notes 26-64 and accompanying text.  For the purposes of this
Note, the moniker “Lloyd’s” shall be used to refer indiscriminately to Lloyd’s of London in its
sundry incarnations, with the more precise name being employed only when necessary to avoid
confusion.
6. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992);
Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3
F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Allen v.
Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 107 F.3d 1422,
reh’g en banc granted, 121 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1997); Haynsworth, 121 F.3d 956, reh’g en banc
denied, 121 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 1997).
7. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
8. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
9. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996).
10. See Haynsworth, 121 F.3d 956, reh’g en banc denied, 121 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 1997).
11. See Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995).
12. See Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
13. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
14. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 107 F.3d 1422, reh’g en banc granted, 121 F.3d 565
(9th Cir. 1997).
15. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 121 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1997).
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clauses in Lloyd’s international securities contracts are enforceable,
the logic that has lead to that consensus has often been very different.
So much so, in fact, that one begins to wonder whether this much
heralded consensus is in fact limited only to Lloyd’s use of such
clauses.  Specifically, there appears to be a marked difference of
opinion among the circuits as to which method of analysis is most ap-
propriate for evaluating such clauses.  That the various analytical
processes employed by the courts have all lead to upholding Lloyd’s
COL and COF clauses has only served to insidiously obfuscate this
epistemological rift.
This Note will attempt to lay bare the diverse analyses of the cir-
cuit courts and to identify their points of commonality.  Part II of this
Note will review the background issues and facts against which the
Lloyd’s cases stand in relief.  It will briefly discuss the public policy
concerns that undergird U.S. securities law and then proceed to
quickly survey Lloyd’s unique history, organization, and mode of op-
eration.  Part III of this Note will canvass the Supreme Court’s
treatment of COL and COF clauses in international contracts and
analyze the appellate courts’ interpretations of the Supreme Court’s
decisions as they attempt to evaluate Lloyd’s use of such clauses.
Part IV of this Note will identify and discuss the points of similarity
among the disparate opinions of the circuit courts.  Finally, Part V of
this Note will conclude by bringing together the observations made
throughout this article.
II.  BACKGROUND
Before one can discuss fluently the issues involved in the Lloyd’s
cases, it is necessary to first review the background against which
these cases stand in relief.  In particular, understanding the public
policy undergirding U.S. securities law is critical to fully compre-
hending the dilemma that courts face when they are asked to uphold
or strike down Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses.  Furthermore, because
Lloyd’s is unlike most insurance companies, much confusion can be
avoided up front by quickly surveying its history, organization, and
mode of operation.
A.  U.S. Securities Law
Modern U.S. securities law was born out of the ashes of the mar-
ket crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.16  The lesson
16. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (1997); Elisabeth Keller &
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learned from those experiences was that a market completely free
and unregulated was perhaps not a good thing; under such conditions,
it was just too easy for rapacious corporations and unscrupulous
businessmen to swindle innocent and unsophisticated investors.17  The
beneficent hand of government, it was believed, was needed to pro-
tect the little guy.18
With the goal of protection in mind, Congress enacted the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 to regulate the distribution of securities by issuers
to public investors.19  The primary means by which the Act sought to
achieve this goal was by imposing mandatory disclosure require-
ments.20
In response to a Presidential message urging that there be added to
the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine of “let the
seller also beware,” Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933.
Designed to protect investors, the Act requires issues, underwrites,
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of secu-
rities sold in interstate and foreign commerce to prevent fraud in
their sale.21
One year later, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to regulate securities exchange markets and the operations of
corporations listed on national securities exchanges.22
While the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were designed
for different purposes, they were both motivated by the same under-
lying public policy concerns:
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.  The focus
of the Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system; the
sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the ex-
changes on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation
to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors.23
Additionally, both Acts were animated by a paternalistic, almost
patronizing, concern for the unsophisticated securities buyer.  Indeed,
Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329-30 (1988).
17. See COX, supra note 16, at 3 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1933);
Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 16, at 338.
18. See generally COX, supra note 16, at 3-10 (describing the historical origins of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Acts).
19. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 16,at 330.
20. See COX, supra note 16, at 3; Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 16, at 342-44.
21. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
22. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 16, at 330.
23. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
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Congressional confidence in the small investor’s ability to fend for
himself was so lacking that both acts expressly forbade any attempt
to waive the rights and protections of the securities laws.  Section 14
of the Securities Act states: “Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring security to waive compliance with any
provision of this Act or of the rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion shall be void.”24  Similarly, Section 29 of the Exchange Act, using
near identical language, states: “Any condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this Act or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby, shall be void.”25  These antiwaiver provi-
sions testify to Congress’ commitment to protect the small investor in
spite of himself.
B.  Lloyd’s of London
Begun in the late 17th century in a coffeehouse which was a
gathering place for marine underwriters and shipowners, the Society
of Lloyd’s arose from a need for individual underwriters to share the
risks of insuring ships and their cargo.26  To that end, Lloyd’s was
originally granted a semi-exclusive right to underwrite marine risks in
the United Kingdom.27  By the mid-1800s, Lloyd’s had begun to in-
sure risks other than marine; and by the late 1800s Lloyd’s was in-
suring marine and non-marine risks in the United States.28
The organization and operation of Lloyd’s is based on six acts of
Parliament (the Lloyd’s Acts of 1871, 1888, 1911, 1925, and 1982).29
For example, the Corporation of Lloyd’s, which is charged with con-
ducting administrative functions, was created by the Lloyd’s Act of
1871.30  The same act also established the Committee of Lloyd’s,
comprised of members of the Society of Lloyd’s, to manage the af-
fairs of the organization.31  More recently, the Council of Lloyd’s,
which is analogous to a board of directors and officers in a U.S. cor-
poration, was created by the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 to replace the
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1994).
26. Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, No. 3:96CV522, 1996 WL 490177, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23,
1996).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at *3.
31. See id.
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Committee of Lloyd’s.32
In spite of its historical origins, Lloyd’s is not an insurance com-
pany in the traditional sense.33  Rather, Lloyd’s is a British insurance
market somewhat analogous to the New York Stock Exchange.34
Business is transacted in this market by insurance brokers, active un-
derwriters, Members’ Agents, Managing Agents, and Names.35  A
“Name” is the term used for an individual investor who is a member
of Lloyd’s.36  The Names are represented by a Members’ Agent
whom they select from among several candidates designated by
Lloyd’s.37  The Members’ Agent, in turn, places the Names in syndi-
cates which are run by Managing Agents who are approved and
regulated by Lloyd’s.38  Significantly, while the Names are the ulti-
mate underwriters of the insurance, they are prohibited by Lloyd’s
rules from participating in the underwriting process or in the recruit-
ing of other Names into the syndicates to which they are signed.39
Judge Lasker, sitting on the Southern District of New York, has
neatly described the mechanics of Lloyd’s operation:
Member’s agents recruit new Names and handle the admission of
Names to Lloyd’s membership.  Member’s agents are ordinarily
also chosen to act as Names’ underwriting agents and, in that role,
are responsible for placing names in syndicates.  In connection with
the latter the member’s agent contracts with the “managing agent”
to place the member in a group comprised of two to several hun-
dred other Names.  These groups constitute the syndicates. Man-
aging agents run the syndicates.  They hire the syndicates active
underwriter and maintain the syndicates’ accounts and other rec-
ords, among other things.
An employee of the managing agent, known as the “active under-
writer,” acts on behalf of the Names in the syndicate in the
“buying” and “selling” of insurance risks.  Active underwriters are
seated on the underwriting floor at Lloyd’s of London.  Brokers
approach the active underwriter at his desk—in Lloyd’s parlance
“the box”—to solicit the underwriter’s agreement to accept a risk.
The active underwriter decides which of the risks, offered to him by
brokers, to accept and at what premium, and negotiates the condi-
tions of coverage and the proportion of risk his syndicate will as-
32. See id.
33. See id. at *2.
34. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1357 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. See Allen, 1996 WL 490177, at *3.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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sume.40
By means of this arrangement, the Names subscribe to a certain
percentage of risks on policies written through the syndicates to
which they subscribe.41  In return for accepting this risk, the Names
are entitled to a certain percentage of the premium paid to the syndi-
cate by the insured minus any insured losses and all fees and
charges.42
Because the Lloyd’s market operates on a three-year accounting
cycle, underwriting profits and losses for each syndicate year of ac-
count are not determined until the end of the second calendar year
after the syndicate year of account has ended.43  Thus, the syndicate
year of account remains open for completing business underwritten
in that year of account.44  To close the syndicate’s year of account, its
Managing Agent must estimate the liabilities on incurred claims.45
These estimated liabilities are then re-insured by another syndicate
which underwrites them in a subsequent year of account.46  This proc-
ess usually occurs at the end of the third year and is called
“reinsurance to close.”47
Membership in Lloyd’s has been available to U.S. citizens since
1969, although U.S. corporations have been permitted to become
Names only since 1994.48  As of 1995, however, individual citizens of
the United States can no longer be Names.49  To become members, all
Names must first apply to Lloyd’s.50  As such, they must undergo a
personal interview in London to assure that they understand the na-
ture of the risks they will be incurring, and they must pass a “means
test” to ensure that they will be able to meet the obligations to which
they are subscribing.51
Once a Name is approved by Lloyd’s to become a member, he
40. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 796 F. Supp. 103, 10405 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 996
F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
41. See Allen, 1996 WL 490177, at *4.
42. See id.
43. See id. at *5.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at *3.
49. See id.
50. See id. at *4.
51. See id.
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must pay an entrance fee and deposit a letter of credit with Lloyd’s.52
Among other things, the Name must promise to meet any cash calls
in the event the premium trust funds (where the premium revenue
generated by the syndicates is held and invested) are inadequate to
pay an incurred loss.53  Furthermore, the Name must accept unlimited
liability, to which he pledges his entire net worth, up to the percent-
age of risk he agreed to accept when he joined a syndicate.54
As a condition to membership, each Name is required to execute
a contract with Lloyd’s, known as the “General Undertaking.”55  Sec-
tion 2.1 of the General Undertaking contains a COL clause: “The
rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to the
Members’ membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business
at, Lloyd’s and any other matter referred to in this Undertaking shall
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Eng-
land.”56  Section 2.2 of the General Undertaking contains a COF
clause:
Each party hereto irrevocable agrees that the courts of England
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or contro-
versy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to the Mem-
bers membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at,
Lloyd’s and that accordingly any suit, action or proceeding
(together in this Clause Two referred to as ‘Proceedings’) arising
out of or relating to such matters shall be brought in such courts
and, to this end, each party hereto irrevocably agrees to submit to
the jurisdiction of the courts of England and irrevocably waives any
objection which it may have now or hereafter to (a) any Proceed-
ings being brought in any such court as is referred to in this Clause
Two and (b) any claim that any such Proceedings have been
brought in an inconvenient forum and further irrevocably agrees
that a judgment in any Proceedings brought in the English courts
shall be conclusive and binding upon each party and shall be en-
forced in the courts of any other jurisdiction.57
Notably, the General Undertaking does not contain an arbitration
clause.58
Each Name also executes a contract with his Members’ Agent,
titled the “Members’ Agent’s Agreement,” which contains COL
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at *6.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1358 (2d Cir. 1993).
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(English), COF (England), and COP (arbitration) clauses.59  Addi-
tionally, the Members’ Agent’s Agreement authorizes the Members’
Agents to execute yet a third contract on behalf of the Names, called
the “Managing Agent’s Agreement.”60  This agreement defines the
rights and obligations of the Managing Agent of a syndicate and of
that syndicate’s Names.61  It also contains COL (English), COF
(England), and COP (arbitration) clauses.62  Finally, the Managing
Agent’s Agreement authorizes the Managing Agent to execute, on
behalf of the Names, a contract titled the “Syndicate and Arbitration
Agreement” which contains COF and COP clauses requiring that all
disputes be arbitrated in London.63
Such, then, is the system that Lloyd’s has developed and em-
ployed over the course of nearly three hundred years, and for the bet-
ter part of that time it has worked remarkably well.  In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, however, many Lloyd’s syndicates began to incur
heavy losses due to asbestos, pollution, and health hazard claims, as
well as claims arising out of natural and man-made disasters such as
Hurricane Hugo, Pan Am Flight 103, and the Exxon Valdez.64  Given
the potentially unlimited liability facing the Names, it was only a mat-
ter of time before Lloyd’s was protecting its interests in court.
III.  THE COURTS
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to hear any of
the Lloyd’s cases, it has set the stage for the lower courts’ analyses
with its decisions in four separate cases: The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Company,65 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company,66 Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,67 and Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute.68  Indeed, the appellate courts of seven federal
circuits—the Second,69 Fourth,70 Fifth,71 Sixth,72 Seventh,73 Ninth,74 and
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, No. 3:96CV522, 1996 WL 490177, at *7 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 23, 1996).
65. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
66. 447 U.S. 506 (1974)
67. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
68. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
69. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
70. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Tenth75 Circuits—have relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in
these four cases to determine the validity of the COL and COF
clauses employed by Lloyd’s in the contracts it requires Names to
sign.
A.  The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court first addressed the use of COF clauses in in-
ternational contracts in 1972 with its opinion in The Bremen v. Za-
pata Off-Shore Company.76  Zapata was a Houston-based American
corporation that had contracted with Unterweser, a German corpora-
tion, to tow Zapata’s drilling rig from Louisiana to a point off
Ravenna, Italy, in the Adriatic Sea.77  Four days after Unterweser’s
deep-sea tug set off with the rig in tow, it encountered a storm in in-
ternational waters in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico.78  The sharp
roll of the rig caused its elevator legs, which had been raised for the
voyage, to break off and fall into the sea.79  On Zapata’s instructions,
the damaged rig was towed to the nearest port of refuge in Tampa,
Florida,80 where Zapata commenced a suit in admiralty.81  Unterweser
responded by invoking the COF clause in its contract: “Any dispute
arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice.”82
In its opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that COF
clauses had historically not been favored by American courts.83  At
the same time, however, it observed that a number of courts had be-
gun to adopt a more “hospitable” attitude toward such clauses.84  The
Court felt this newer approach was the better doctrine in light of
modern trends in international trade:85
71. See Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, reh’g en banc denied, 121 F.3d 614 (5th
Cir. 1997).
72. See Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995).
73. See Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
74. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 107 F.3d 1422, reh’g en banc granted, 121 F.3d 565
(9th Cir. 1997).
75. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
76. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 3-4.
82. Id. at 1.
83. See id. at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85. See id.
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For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of over-
seas commercial activities by business enterprises based in the
United States.  The barrier of distance that once tended to confine
a business concern to a modest territory no longer does so . . . . The
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a paro-
chial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, gov-
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts.86
As such, the Court chose to break with the historical mistrust of
COF clauses.  It decreed that “such clauses are prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”87  Elucidating
this general pronouncement, the Court advised the lower court: “The
correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause spe-
cifically unless Zapata could clearly show the enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such rea-
sons as fraud or overreaching.”88  Several lines later, the Court added:
“A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable
if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision.”89
Notably, the Court was disinclined to accept “inconvenience” as
a sufficient ground for invalidating such a clause:
[W]here it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time
they entered into the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated
private international commercial agreement contemplated the
claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of
inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause unen-
forceable.90
It did allow, however, that the exceptional inconvenience of a forum
might be indicative of other reasons for invalidating a COF clause.
The remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was
an adhesive one, or that the parties did not have the particular con-
troversy in mind when they made their agreement; yet even there
the party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof.  Similarly,
selection of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to an es-
sentially American controversy might contravene an important
86. Id. at 8-9.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id at 15.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 16.
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public policy of the forum.91
But no matter how inconvenient a chosen forum might be, whenever
a COF clause is freely negotiated, “it should be incumbent on the
party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the contrac-
tual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”92
Thus, the court identified four grounds (the Bremen factors) suf-
ficient to invalidate a COF clause: (1) if the contract were obtained
through “fraud or overreaching”; (2) if the forum were so remote
that the complaining party would “for all practical purposes be de-
prived of his day in court”; (3) if enforcement would be
“unreasonable and unjust”; and (4) if enforcement “would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought,
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”93 In light of the
Court’s prior admonition that COF clauses were to be deemed
“prima facie valid,” this list of four factors quickly came to be re-
garded as an exclusive cannon, one that precluded all other possible
grounds for invalidating a COF clause.94
There is, however, an alternate interpretation of the Supreme
Courts’ Bremen factors.  Specifically, the first, second and fourth fac-
tors might be understood to be merely expanding on the third factor,
which is set out as a general proposition; in which case it could be ar-
gued that there are only three Bremen factors that ever need to be
considered.  Such a reading, however, would be counterintuitive to
manner in which the Court chose to present its list of factors: “The
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 18.
93. These factors have been ordered so as to conform to the Second Circuit’s restatement
of them in Roby:
The Supreme Court has construed this exception narrowly: forum selection and choice
of law clauses are “unreasonable” (1) if their incorporation into the agreement was
the result of fraud or overreaching; (2) if the complaining party “will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court,” due to the grave inconvenience or unfair-
ness of the selected forum; (3) if the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may
deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) if the clauses contravene a strong public policy
of the forum state.
Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see infra
note 172 and accompanying text.  The Second Circuit was the first court to actually enumerate
this list, and its iteration of the Bremen factors has become the standard version of the Bremen
Court’s analysis.  For a discussion of the difference between the Supreme Court’s formulation
of these factors and the Second Circuit’s formulation of them, see infra notes 172-78 and ac-
companying text.
94. See, e.g., Riley, 969 F.2d at 958, 959; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363; Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160;
Shell, 55 F.3d at 1229-30; Allen, 94 F.3d at 928; Richards, 107 F.3d at 1429; Haynsworth, 121
F.3d at 963.
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correct approach would have been to enforce the forum clause . . .
unless . . . enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or . . . .”95
The construction of this sentence does not easily lend itself to the in-
terpretation that “unreasonable and unjust” is a general rubric under
which the remaining three factors are to be subsumed.  Rather, the
either/or structure suggests that the two halves of the sentence should
be given equal weight.  Furthermore, the later passages discussing the
second and fourth factors never refer back to the concept of
“unreasonable and unjust.”96  And in any case, the Supreme Court
had already identified its general rubric as “‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances.” Among the things that the Court apparently consid-
ered to be “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances” were
“unreasonable and unjust” clauses; the words “and unjust” thus serve
to prevent this reasoning from becoming tautological.  As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that the third Bremen factor is separate and
distinct from the other three factors; it must be satisfied on its own
terms and not by reference to whether the other three factors are
satisfied.97
Two years later, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company,98 the Su-
preme Court expanded its ruling in Bremen to include COL and COP
clauses.  Alberto-Culver was an American manufacturer and dis-
tributor of toiletries and hair products with its principle place of
business in Illinois.99  In an effort to expand its operations overseas,
Alberto-Culver entered into a contract with Scherk, a German citi-
zen, to purchase three of Scherk’s German businesses.100 When Al-
berto-Culver later discovered that the trademark rights it had pur-
chased were subject to substantial encumbrances, it attempted to
rescind the contract; and when Scherk refused, Alberto-Culver com-
menced an action contending that Scherk’s fraudulent representa-
tions concerning the trademark rights constituted a violation of the
Exchange Act.101
The contract signed by Alberto-Culver and Scherk contained a
clause providing that the laws of the State of Illinois would apply to
and govern the agreement and that any controversy or claim would
95. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
96. See id. at 15, 17-18.
97. But see infra notes 178-78 and accompanying text.
98. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
99. See id. at 508.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 509.
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be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris, France.102  The question before the Supreme
Court was whether the COP clause (calling for the arbitration of all
disputes) should be held to the same standards, as set out in Bremen,
as the COF clause (naming Paris, France, as the forum).103  Signifi-
cantly, the question of whether the COL clause (invoking the laws of
the State of Illinois) should also be held to the Bremen standards
never arose: the Court seemed to simply accept as a fact that COL
clauses and COF clauses should be treated in the same manner.
Bremen, it should be recalled, specifically involved only a COF
clause.104 In its analysis, however, the Court seemed to conflate the
implications of that clause—and of COF clauses in general—with
those of COL clauses:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a pa-
rochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.105
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved by our courts.106
Moreover, while the contract here did not specifically provide that
the substantive law of England should be applied, it is the general
rule in English courts that the parties are assumed, absent contrary
indication, to have designated the forum with the view that it
should apply its own law. . . .  It is therefore reasonable to conclude
that the forum clause was also an effort to obtain certainty as to the
applicable substantive law.107
Similarly, selection of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law
to an essentially American controversy might contravene an impor-
tant public policy of the forum.108
The Bremen Court never addressed COL clauses beyond these
casual remarks, nor did it ponder the possible distinctions between
COL and COF clauses.  The Court’s reasoning, however, was none-
theless perspicuous; and in Scherk, the Court followed the path that
Bremen had begun to pave: it seamlessly elided its analysis of COF
clauses into its analysis of COL clauses.  Thus, while the contract
102. See id. at 508.
103. See id. at 509.
104. See The Bremen v. Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
105. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 13 n.15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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signed by Alberto-Culver and Scherk contained a COL clause, the
Court assumed a priori that such a clause would have to be evaluated
against the standards set out in Bremen for COF clauses.
Turning its attention to the COP clause, the Scherk Court found
that an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal was merely
a “specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the
situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dis-
pute.”109  Therefore, COP clauses, as a subset of COF clauses, should
be held to the same Bremen standards as any other COF clause.  Re-
affirming its analysis in Bremen, the Court emphasized the necessity
of COL and COF clauses for modern international trade: “A contrac-
tual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness of predictability es-
sential to any international business transaction.”110
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an in-
ternational arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jock-
eying by the parties to secure tactical litigational advantages . . . .
[T]he dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man’s-land would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil
the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into interna-
tional commercial agreements.111
Determining that COL, COF, and COP clauses should all be
governed by a Bremen analysis did not end the Court’s inquiry, how-
ever.  Scherk involved claims brought under the Exchange Act.
Wilko v. Swan,112 the controlling opinion at the time, held that an
agreement to arbitrate, such as the COP clause in the Alberto-
Culver/Scherk contract, violated the antiwaiver provisions of U.S. se-
curities law.113  Thus, it was arguable that the COP clause satisfied the
fourth Bremen factor for invalidation as a contravention of a strong
public policy. Rather than confront Wilko head-on, however, the
Court sought to side-step the issue by focusing on the international
109. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).  “Under some circumstances,
the designation of arbitration in a certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the
law of that place to apply to that transaction.”  Id. at 519 n.13.
110. Id. at 516.
111. Id. at 516-17.
112. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
113. In fact, Wilko involved a claim brought under the Securities Act.  See id. at 428.  The
Court in Scherk, however, accepted arguendo that antiwaiver provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act operated identically.  See Scherk, 417. U.S. at 515.
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character of the contract in Scherk, thereby distinguishing it from the
contract in Wilko:
[T]he respondent’s reliance on Wilko in this case ignores the signifi-
cant and, we find, crucial differences between the agreement in-
volved in Wilko and the one signed by the parties here.  Alberto-
Culver’s contract to purchase the business entities belonging to
Scherk was a truly international agreement.114
In this case, by contrast, in the absence of the arbitration provision
considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement, and
still exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of dis-
putes arising out of the contract.115
The Court reasoned that the wide choice of courts and venue,
which the Wilko Court had identified as an advantage that the anti-
waiver provisions were intended to protect, simply did not exist in the
context of international contracts.  “[T]hese advantages become chi-
merical since . . . an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign
court block or hinder access to the American court of the purchaser’s
choice.”116  Thus, had Scherk involved a domestic contract, the COP
clause at issue would likely have satisfied the fourth Bremen factor—
i.e., there would have been a strong public policy argument for in-
validating the COP clause as a contravention of the Exchange Act’s
goal of maintaining broad avenues of remedy to U.S. securities buy-
ers.  Because an international contract was at the heart of the dispute
in Scherk, however, any such concerns were effectively emasculated
because the mere potential of legal recourse to jurisdictions outside
the United States undermined this public policy a priori.
In 1985, the Supreme Court, in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,117 relied on the distinction between
domestic and international contracts when it found an agreement to
resolve antitrust claims by arbitration should be upheld when the
agreement arises from an international transaction.
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for predictability
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forth-
coming in a domestic context.118
114. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
115. Id. at 516.
116. Id. at 518.
117. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
118. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
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Mitsubishi involved a dispute between Mitsubishi Motors, a
Japanese automobile manufacturer, and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, a
Puerto Rican automobile distributor.119  The contract at issue con-
tained a clause that stated in part: “All disputes, controversies or dif-
ferences which may arise . . .  shall be finally settled by arbitration in
Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association.”120  Thus, as in Scherk, the
Court was faced with a COL provision (the rules and regulations of
the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association), a COF provision
(Japan), and a COP provision (arbitration).  And as in Scherk, there
were federal claims—viz. antitrust claims under the Sherman Act121—
that suggested strong public policy reasons for not upholding the
COP provision.
In its opinion, the Court initially observed that Bremen and
Scherk “establish a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of
freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions.”122  The
Court also emphasized the utility of arbitration to the efficiency of
modern international trade:
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the
course of that trade . . . . If [arbitration tribunals] are to take a cen-
tral place in the international legal order, national courts will need
to “shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,” and also their
customary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of
a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transnational tri-
bunal.123
Ultimately, however, the Court was unconvinced that the public
policy motives undergirding the Sherman Act would be contravened
if the provisions of the contract were upheld: “The importance of the
private damages remedy . . . does not compel the conclusion that it
may not be sought outside an American court.”124  In other words,
while there were important public policy concerns at stake, the Court
was not convinced that they were being sufficiently jeopardized so as
to satisfy the fourth Bremen factor.  The Court pointed out:
There is no reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that inter-
119. See id. at 616-17.
120. Id. at 617.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
122. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
123. Id. at 638 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
124. Id. at 635.
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national arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism . . . .
The tribunal . . . is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a
defined set of claims which includes . . .  those arising from the ap-
plication of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should
be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law
giving rise to the claim.125
In a footnote (Footnote 19), however, the Court did allow that
“in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated
in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statu-
tory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”126  This off-
hand comment would be picked up time and again by various claim-
ants and courts.127
In its most recent case involving COL and COF clauses in inter-
national contracts, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,128 the Supreme
Court again upheld the validity of such provisions.  Eulala Shute
(Shute), a resident of the State of Washington,129 brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
against Carnival Cruise Lines (Carnival), a corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Florida,130 after Shute slipped on a deck mat
and injured herself during a cruise in international waters off the
coast of Mexico.131  Significantly, on the first page of Shute’s ticket
was a COF clause: “[A]ll disputes and matters . . . shall be litigated, if
at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to
the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.”132
While Bremen concerned the enforceability of a COF clause in a
“far from routine” contract between two business corporations,133
Shute involved a “purely routine” contract between an individual and
a corporation.134  This, it seemed to the Court, was an important dif-
ference: “In evaluating the reasonableness of the forum clause at is-
sue in this case, we must refine the analysis of The Bremen to account
125. Id. at 636-37.
126. Id. at 637 n.19.
127. See supra notes 155-59, 192-93, 216, 254-56, 272-74 and accompanying text.
128. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
129. See id. at 587.
130. See id. at 595.
131. See id. at 588.
132. Id. at 587-88.
133. Id. at 592 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972)).
134. Id. at 593.
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for the realities of form passage contracts.”135
Refining the analysis of the Bremen, however, ultimately meant
refusing to extend its list of sufficient grounds for invalidating a COF
clause.  Specifically, the Court declined to hold that the absence of
bargaining, without anything more, was sufficient grounds for invali-
dating a COF clause.136  Harkening back to the Bremen court’s con-
tention that the complaining party should bear a heavy burden of
proof even when a contract by adhesion is involved,137 the Court
stated in Shute: “As an initial matter, we do not accept the Court of
Appeal’s determination that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause
in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply because it is not
the subject of bargaining.”138  Indeed, the Court proposed at least
three justifications for including such a clause in a form contract: (1)
A cruise line, because it carries passengers from many locales, “has a
special interest in limiting the fora in which it could potentially be
subject to suit;” (2) A COF clause “has the salutory effect of dispel-
ling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must
be brought and defended;” and (3) Passengers “benefit in the form of
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by lim-
iting the fora in which it may be sued.”139
In light of these possible justifications for the COF clause, it
would seem that Shute failed to satisfy her heavy burden of proof.  In
any case, the Court did not find the forum so remote as to invoke the
concerns raised in Bremen.  “In the present case, Florida is not a
‘remote alien forum,’ nor—given the fact that Mrs. Shute’s accident
occurred off the coast of Mexico—is this dispute an essentially local
one inherently more suited to resolution in the State of Washington
than in Florida.”140  Almost as an afterthought, the Court allowed that
COF clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judi-
cial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, but it found no indication that
Carnival had selected Florida as its forum in order to discourage pas-
sengers from pursuing legitimate claims.141
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
138. Shute, 499 U.S. at 593.
139. Id. at 593-94.
140. Shute, 499 U.S. at 585.
141. Id. at 595.
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B.  The Federal Circuits Weigh In
Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,142 a Tenth Circuit
case, was the first of the recent federal appellate cases involving the
COL and COF clauses in Lloyd’s contracts.  Riley was a U.S. citizen
and a member of Lloyd’s; Kinglsey Underwriting Agencies
(Kinglsey), a British entity, was a registered underwriting agency
with Lloyd’s.143  In 1980, Riley entered into a General Undertaking
with Lloyd’s and a Members’ Agent’s Agreement with Kingsley.144
Both agreements provided that the courts of England would have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over any dispute (COF clause) and that the laws
of England would apply (COL clause).145 Additionally, the Members’
Agent’s Agreement provided for arbitration in the event of any dis-
pute (COP clause).146
By the end of the 1980’s, Riley’s syndicates experienced large
losses resulting in calls exceeding £300,000.147  Faced with the prospect
of either meeting these calls or having Lloyd’s draw against his letter
of credit, Riley filed an action seeking declaratory judgment, recis-
sion, and damages against Kingsley claiming, among other thing,
violation of the Securities Act.148  Prior to a preliminary injunction
hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation limiting the hearing to
the threshold issues of the applicability and effect of the COF and the
COP clauses.149
The Tenth Circuit lost no time finding these clauses to be valid.150
It purported based its determination on three factors: (1) the interna-
tional character of the contract, (2) the fact that all the parties other
than Riley were British, and (3) the fact that virtually all the activities
giving rise to Riley’s claims occurred in England.151  “When an
agreement is truly international, as here, and reflects numerous con-
tacts with the foreign forum, the Supreme Court has quite clearly
held that the parties’ choice of law and forum selection provisions
142. 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
143. See id. at 955.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 956.
148. See id.  Riley also alleged that Kingsley had violated Colorado state securities law and
had committed common law fraud.  See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 956.
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will be given effect.”152  Its analysis, however, was heavily influenced
by the Supreme Court’s Bremen factors, although it never identified
them as explicitly as later courts would.
Initially, the Riley court cited Bremen for the proposition that
“[f]orum selection provisions are ‘prima facie valid’ and a party re-
sisting enforcement carries a heavy burden of showing that the provi-
sion itself is invalid due to fraud or overreaching or that enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust under the circumstances.”153  Else-
where in its opinion the court addressed two other possibilities for
invalidating the COF and COP clauses:
Riley suggests that enforcement of the choice of forum and law
provisions is unreasonable because he effectively will be deprived
of his day in court.154
[Riley’s] argument is that the agreement requiring arbitration
should be held void as against public policy because several of his
claims are grounded in the 1933 and 1934 securities acts, and the
application of English law would result in a waiver of certain provi-
sions of those acts.155
In this way, over the course of its analysis, the court eventually
acknowledged the first (“fraud or overreaching”), second (no “day in
court”), third (“unreasonable and unjust”), and fourth (contravenes
“a strong public policy”) Bremen factors.  Additionally, the court
cited Shute to effectively create a new, fifth, Bremen factor: “Only a
showing of inconvenience so serious as to foreclose a remedy, per-
haps coupled with a showing of bad faith, overreaching or lack of no-
tice, would be sufficient to defeat a contractual forum selection
clause.”156
Riley, relying on Footnote 19 in Mitsubishi,157 maintained that
the provisions of the Lloyd’s contract effectively deprived him of all
152. Id. at 957.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 958.
155. Id. at 959.
156. Id. at 958 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-96 (1991)).
This reading of Shute, however, is a bit of a stretch.  The closest that the Supreme Court actu-
ally came to stating such a proposition on the page cited by the Riley court is when it wrote that
“there is no indication that petitioner set Florida as the forum in which disputes were resolved
as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims,” and perhaps
later when it wrote that the COF clause “does not take away respondents’ right to ‘a trial by [a]
court of competent jurisdiction.’”  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-96
(1991); see infra note 177 and accompanying text.  Undaunted, the Second Circuit would none-
theless embrace this new Bremen factor in Roby.  See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d
1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993); infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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substantive rights under federal securities law and should therefore
be invalidated as a contravention of strong public policy.158  The
court, however, was unconvinced.  It observed that Riley’s contention
was based on the theory that recovery would be more difficult under
English law than American law.159  “Riley suggests that enforcement
of the choice of forum and law provisions is unreasonable because he
effectively will be deprived of his day in court.  The basis underlying
this contention is his perception that recovery will be more difficult
under English law than under American law.”160  To this, the court
answered:
Riley will not be deprived of his day in court.  He may, though,
have to structure his case differently than if proceeding in federal
district court.  The fact that an international transaction may be
subject to laws and remedies different or less favorable than those
of the United States is not a valid basis to deny enforcement, pro-
vided that the law of the chosen forum is not inherently unfair.161
In thus attempting to determine whether the fourth Bremen fac-
tor had been satisfied, the Tenth Circuit effectively chose to use the
second Bremen factor as its yardstick: if Riley were being deprived of
his day in court, then a strong public policy would be violated.  Fur-
thermore, in attempting to determine whether the second Bremen
factor had been satisfied, the court went on to use another Bremen
factor—the third factor—as its yardstick: if there were sufficient
remedies available to Riley, then he was not being deprived of his
day in court.  Because the Riley court hadn’t enumerated the Bremen
factors in the way the Roby court later would,162 it remained oblivious
to its circuitous logic.
In any event, a consequence of this analysis is that where the
Mitsubishi Court had held that the possibility of a threat to an indi-
vidual’s substantive rights under federal law (because an interna-
tional arbitration panel might come to a different conclusion than a
U.S. court would) was not sufficient to qualify as grounds for invali-
dating a COF or COP—and by extension a COL—clause, the Riley
court now went one step further.  Mere abridgment of one’s substan-
tive rights, because of fewer and less favorable remedies, say, might
not be enough.  Under the Riley court’s analysis, even if such a poten-
158. See Riley, 969 F.2d at 957.
159. See id. at 958.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 169.
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tial threat as identified by the Mitsubishi court were to become an ac-
tuality, only a substantial waiver of one’s substantive rights would
likely satisfy the Bremen factors. (Because of the Riley court’s con-
voluted analysis, it is impossible to be more specific and say exactly
which bar its holding effectively raises—that for the second, third, or
fourth Bremen factor.)
One year later Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s163 came before the
Second Circuit.  This time, Roby, a Name, brought suit against
Lloyd’s directly.  As in Riley, Roby alleged violations of the Securi-
ties Act.164  Additionally, Roby alleged Lloyd’s had committed viola-
tions of the Exchange Act and RICO.165  The district court, relying on
the provisions of Roby’s contract with Lloyd’s, dismissed the com-
plaint in its entirety for improper venue.166  Roby appealed, arguing
(1) the COL, COF, and COP clauses, by their terms, did not apply to
the substance of Roby’s claims, and (2) the clauses were unenforce-
able as a violation of public policy codified by the securities laws
(thus satisfying the fourth Bremen factor).167
The appellate court seemed to be genuinely aghast at the impli-
cations of Roby’s contention that the clauses of his contract did not
apply to the substance of his claims.  The court wrote:
It defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff may circumvent forum
selection and arbitration clauses merely by stating claims under
laws not recognized by the forum selected in the agreement.  A
plaintiff would simply have to allege violations of his country’s tort
law or his country’s statutory law or his country’s property law in
order to render nugatory any forum selection clause that implicitly
or explicitly required the application of the law of another jurisdic-
tion.  We refuse to allow a party’s solemn promise to be defeated
by artful pleading.168
To prevent this outcome, the court relied on reasoning similar to
that employed in Riley. It effectively held that even if a potential
threat to an individual’s substantive rights were to become an actual-
ity, the court would still not invalidate the clauses of a contract unless
those rights were being substantially denied: “In the absence of other
considerations, the agreement to submit to arbitration or the jurisdic-
163. 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
164. See id. at 1358.
165. See id.  RICO stands for “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.”  See
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 1360.
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tion of English courts must be enforced even if that agreement tacitly
includes the forfeiture of some claims that could have been brought in
a different forum.”169  A partial denial of one’s substantive rights
would apparently not be sufficient.
The court next addressed Roby’s second argument that enforc-
ing the provisions of his contract would contravene public policy as
codified in the U.S. securities law.  It observed that the Supreme
Court had found COL and COF clauses to be presumptively valid
where the underlying transaction is fundamentally international in
character.170  However, the Second Circuit was reluctant to interpret
this precedent as broadly as the Tenth Circuit had in Riley.171
Instead, the court began by enumerating the four grounds listed
in Bremen for invalidating such clauses.172  The third Bremen factor
underwent a significant change, however, in the hands of the Roby
court.  Where the Supreme Court had said rather generally that COF
clauses would be invalid if “enforcement [were] unreasonable and
unjust,”173 the Second Circuit, using language similar to that used by
the Tenth Circuit in Riley, now stated that such clauses would be in-
valid “if the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law [would] de-
prive the plaintiff of a remedy.”174  The court first cited Shute, and
then two paragraphs later Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno,175 for this
new version of the third Bremen factor.176  But Shute nowhere men-
tions the deprivation of a plaintiff’s remedy as a basis for invalidating
a COF clause.177  And while Piper does speak of “deprived remedies,”
it does so only in the context of forum non conveniens inquiries and
169. Id. at 1360-61 (emphasis added).
170. See id. at 1362.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1363; supra notes 87-96.
This presumption of validity may be overcome, however, by a clear showing that the
clauses are “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”  The Supreme Court has con-
strued this exception narrowly: forum selection and choice of law clauses are
“unreasonable” (1) if their incorporation into the agreement was the result of fraud or
overreaching; (2) if the complaining party “will for all practical purposes be deprived
of his day in court,” due to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected fo-
rum; (3) if the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a
remedy; or (4) if the clauses contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.
Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
173. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
174. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363; see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
175. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
176. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
177. See supra note 156.  Involving a COF clause as it did, Shute never even had the oppor-
tunity to consider the fundamental unfairness of a chosen law.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991).
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not in the context of COF clauses.178
If the source for this altered third Bremen factor appears dubi-
ous, however, an explanation for why this change should occur at all
is non-existent.  Why did the Roby court feel the need to drop the
Bremen court’s declaration that a COF clause should be found inva-
lid if “enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust?”179  Why
didn’t the Roby court preserve the Supreme Court’s original edict
and simply create an extra, fifth, Bremen factor?  One explanation
might be that the Roby court believed that the terms “‘unreasonable’
under the circumstances” and “unreasonable and unjust” were
equivalent and should both be treated as general rubrics subsuming
the remaining Bremen factors. 180  Whatever the explanation, this ver-
sion of the third Bremen factor has never been challenged, allowing it
to coagulate and harden over time; indeed, at least two other courts
have accepted this “new” third Bremen factor unquestioningly.181
The Roby court quickly ruled out either of the first two Bremen
factors as existing in the case before it.182  Addressing the new third
Bremen factor, the Roby court cited Mitsubishi for the proposition
that “it is not enough that the foreign law or procedure merely be dif-
ferent or less favorable than that of the United States.”183  The Roby
court purported to derive this rule from the Mitsubishi Court’s con-
clusion that it must enforce the clauses of the contract before it,
“even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a do-
mestic context.”184  But this is to read the Mitsubishi excerpt out of
context.  In making this pronouncement, the Mitsubishi Court was
relying on the Scherk Court’s determination that international and
domestic contracts should be treated differently.185  The Scherk Court,
178. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981).
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law should never
be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry.  Of course, if the rem-
edy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it
is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight; the
district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
Id.
179. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
180. For a discussion of why the treatment of these two terms as equivalent would be a mis-
reading of the Supreme Court’s original conception of the Bremen factors, however, see supra
notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
181. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); Haynsworth v. The
Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 963, reh’g en banc denied, 129 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 1997).
182. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
183. Id.
184. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
185. See id.
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in turn, came to this conclusion in the course of determining whether
a specific COP clause at issue before it satisfied the fourth Bremen
factor.186
Oblivious to the judicial genealogy of the proposition it had
cited, the Second Circuit proceeded to blindly apply this rule to its
analysis of whether the third Bremen factor had been satisfied.187  As
such, it phrased the issue as “whether the application of the foreign
law presents a danger that the Roby Names ‘will be deprived of any
remedy or treated unfairly.’”188  The answer, the court concluded, was
no.189  After briefly reviewing English law, the court concluded that
U.S. securities laws would unquestionably provide Roby with a
greater variety of remedies and better odds of success.190  But, ac-
cording to its application of Mitsubishi, that was not sufficient.
Claiming to follow the precedent set by the Supreme Court, the Roby
court held that the remedies available under English law, while per-
haps inferior to those available under U.S. law, were nonetheless
“ample and just.”191
Regarding the fourth Bremen factor, the Roby court felt there
was a serious question as to whether the Lloyd’s clauses had sub-
verted United States public policy.192  The court identified the pri-
mary goal of this public policy as an effort to reverse the common law
rule favoring caveat emptor.193  Furthermore, the court believed the
antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws testified to Con-
gress’s intention that the public policies incorporated into those laws
should not be thwarted: “We believe therefore that the public poli-
cies of the securities laws would be contravened if the applicable for-
eign law failed adequately to deter issuers from exploiting American
investors.”194
Referring to the infamous Footnote 19 in Mitsubishi, the court
expressed a concern that “the Roby Names’ contract clauses may op-
erate ‘in tandem’ as a prospective waiver of the statutory remedies
for securities violations, thereby circumventing the strong and expan-
186. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974).
187. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
188. Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981)).
189. See id at 1365.
190. See id. at 1366.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1363
193. See id. at 1364.
194. Id.
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sive public policy in deterring such violations.”195
We believe that if the Roby Names were able to show that avail-
able remedies in England are insufficient to deter British issuers
from exploiting American investors through fraud, misrepresenta-
tion or inadequate disclosure, we would not hesitate to condemn
the choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration clauses as against
public policy.196
Because the court ultimately determined that English laws were
“ample and just,” however, it held that Roby had failed to make such
a showing.197  Following a mobius-strip logic that seemed to turn in on
itself, the court wrote: “For the reasons set forth in section C below,
however, we conclude that the Roby Names have failed to make such
a showing [that the COF and COP clauses were against public pol-
icy].”198  Section C, in turn, is titled “Availability of Adequate Reme-
dies.”199  In other words, having created a new third Bremen factor
(deprivation of remedies), the Roby court now used it to analyze the
fourth Bremen factor (contravention of public policy); and it found
that the fourth Bremen factor was not satisfied because the third
Bremen factor was not satisfied.
The overall effect of the Second Circuit’s decision was to con-
flate the Supreme Court’s analysis and application of the third and
fourth Bremen factors.  Under Roby, in order to determine whether
the public policies codified in the U.S. securities laws are being con-
travened, one must first determine whether the laws and procedures
of the foreign jurisdiction in question are so fundamentally unfair
that they deprive the plaintiff of a remedy.  This raises the same ques-
tion that the Riley court’s analysis had: Why precondition the satis-
faction of the fourth Bremen factor on the satisfaction of the third
Bremen factor?  If the third Bremen factor is satisfied, why wouldn’t
the court end its inquiry there?  Additionally, where Riley had relied
on Mitsubishi to raise the bar for satisfying the Bremen factors by
suggesting that less rights did not necessarily mean no rights, Roby
now did the same for its new third Bremen factor by observing simi-
larly that less remedies did not necessarily mean no remedies.
The decision in Roby was cited approvingly by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Hugel v. Corporation of Lloyd’s.200  Hugel, however, was ar-
195. Id.; see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
196. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 999 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1993).
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gued so poorly by the plaintiff that the court never had an opportu-
nity to fully consider the arguments at issue.201  A better pleaded case
presented itself just one month later in the form of Bonny v. Society
of Lloyd’s,202 and in that case the Seventh Circuit fully embraced the
Second Circuit’s decision in Roby.203
Relying on Mitsubishi’s Footnote 19, Bonny, a Name, argued
that the COL and COF clauses in his contract with Lloyd’s should be
voided because they collectively violated public policy by prospec-
tively waiving his remedies under the Securities Act.204 Parroting the
argument made in Riley, Bonny claimed that he was being deprived
of his substantive rights under federal securities laws and that he
should therefore be relieved of his agreement on public policy
grounds.205
The Bonny court began it analysis with the prerequisite enu-
meration of the Bremen factors.206  Where the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit had identified four Bremen factors, however, the Sev-
enth Circuit now listed only three—the first (fraud), second
(deprivation of plaintiff’s day in court), and fourth (public policy)—
inexplicably omitting the third Bremen factor.207  Conceivably, the
Bonny court might have dropped the Supreme Court’s “unreasonable
and unjust” factor believing it to be equivalent to “unreasonable un-
der the circumstances” and therefore merely an auxiliary rubric sub-
suming the remaining Bremen factors, much as it has been conjec-
tured the Roby court had done.208  Unlike the Roby court, however,
the Bonny court refrained from creating a new, replacement, third
201. See id. at 210, 211 (complaining plaintiff fundamentally confused COL and COF
clauses).
202. 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
203. See id. at 161, 162.
204. See id. at 159.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 160.
The presumption validity of a forum selection clause can be overcome if the resisting
party can show it is “unreasonable under the circumstance.”  The Supreme Court has
construed this exception narrowly: forum selection and choice of law clauses are
“unreasonable” (1) if their incorporation into the contract was the result of fraud, un-
due influence or overweening bargaining power; (2) if the selected forum is so
“gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the complaining party] will for all practical
purposes be deprived of its day in court”; or (3) if enforcement of the clauses would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, declared
by statute or judicial decision.
Id.
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 179-78 and accompanying text; But see supra notes 95-96 and accom-
panying text.
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factor. In any case, it was the fourth Bremen factor concerning the
contravention of a strong public policy that most concerned the court:
[W]e have serious concerns that Lloyd’s clauses operate as a pro-
spective waiver of statutory remedies for securities violations.  By
including the anti-waiver provisions in the securities laws, Congress
made clear that the public policy of these laws should not be
thwarted . . . . To allow Lloyd’s to avoid liability for putative viola-
tions of the 1933 Act would contravene important American poli-
cies unless remedies available in the selected forum do not subvert
the public policy of that Act.209
Bonny complained that the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 barred him from
pursuing his claims.210  After reviewing the English law, however, the
Seventh Circuit found, as the Second Circuit had in Roby, that “the
available remedies and potential damage recoveries [in English law]
suffice to deter deception of American investors and to induce the
disclosure of material information to investors.”211  The court ob-
served that the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 did not grant immunity in the
event of bad faith.212  Additionally, it pointed out that whatever im-
munity there was under the Lloyd’s Act was not a bar to suit but
rather a defense that Lloyd’s must affirmatively plead.213  In the case
at bar, Lloyd’s had already stipulated that it would not raise this de-
fense.214
As in Riley and Roby, the Bonny court allowed that U.S. federal
securities law might provide plaintiffs with a greater chance of suc-
cess, but it did not believe that this alone was enough to satisfy the
fourth Bremen factor: “Perhaps the United States’ securities laws
would provide plaintiffs with a greater chance of success under
209. Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 161.  Section 14(3) of The Lloyd’s Act of 1982 provides:
Subject to subsection (1), (4), and (5) of this section, the Society shall not be liable for
damages whether for negligence or other tort, breach of duty or otherwise, in respect
to any exercise of or omission to exercise any power, duty, or function conferred or
imposed by Lloyd’s Acts 1871 to 1982 or any byelaw [sic] or regulation made thereun-
der—(d) in so far as relates to the exercise of, or omission to exercise, disciplinary
functions, powers and duties; or (e) in so far as relates to the exercise of, or omission
to exercise, any powers, functions or duties under byelaws [sic] made pursuant to
paragraphs (21), (22), (23), (24), and (25) of Schedule 2 to this Act; unless the act or
omission complained of—(i) was done or omitted to be done in bad faith; or (ii) was
that of an employee of the Society and occurred in the course of the employee carry-
ing out routine or clerical duties, that is to say duties which do no involve the exercise
of any discretion.
Id.
211. Id. at 162.
212. See id. at 161.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 162.
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lighter scienter and causation requirements.  However, enforcing the
clauses here simply means that plaintiffs will have to structure their
case differently than if they were proceeding in federal district
court.”215 Borrowing the Roby court’s trick of measuring to what ex-
tent public policy is being jeopardized by evaluating what sort of
remedies are available to the plaintiff, the Bonny court wrote:
We conclude that the available remedies and potential damage re-
coveries suffice to deter deception of American investors and to in-
duce the disclosure of material information to investors. . . . [T]he
fact that an international transaction may be subject to laws and
remedies different or less favorable than those of the United States
is not alone a valid basis to deny enforcement of forum selection,
arbitration and choice of law clauses.216
Because the Bonny court never formally recognized the Roby
court’s new third Bremen factor (deprivation of a plaintiff’s remedy),
its analysis does not suffer from the ambulatory logic of the Riley and
Roby courts—i.e., it does not precondition the satisfaction of the
fourth Bremen factor on the satisfaction of another Bremen factor.  It
does, however, share with them the effect of raising the bar for satis-
fying a Bremen factor—in this case, the fourth Bremen factor.  Under
the Bonny court’s analysis, mere abridgment of one’s substantive
rights does not necessarily rise to the level of violating public policy.
In Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd.,217 it was the Sixth Circuit’s turn to
confront Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses.  The court began its analysis
by first identifying all the Bremen factors to be considered.218  Nota-
bly, this was the first time that a lower court recognized all four of the
original Bremen factors—twenty-three years after the Supreme Court
had originally formulated them.  Shell, a Name, relied on Footnote 19
in Mitsubishi to argue that the COL and COF clauses in his contract
with Lloyd’s were unenforceable because they collectively deprived
him of his substantive rights under Ohio securities law and were
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995).
218. Id. at 1229-30.
A forum selection clause in an international agreement “should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside.”  “The correct approach [is] to enforce the
forum clause specifically unless” plaintiffs “[can] clearly show that enforcement would
be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching.”  The presumptive validity of the forum selection clause may also be set
aside if plaintiffs can show that “trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely in-
convenient that [they] will for all practical purposes be deprived of [their] day in
court,” or if “enforcement would contravene a strong public policy” of the forum
state.
Id.
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therefore against public policy.219
In spite of its historical accuracy in reciting the Bremen factors,
the Shell court employed the more modern analysis used by the Riley,
Roby and Bonny courts.  It chose to determine the danger that
threatened the public policy undergirding Ohio law by evaluating the
remedies available to the plaintiffs if the clauses were enforced.220
The Shell court observed that the Second Circuit had addressed this
issue in Roby and rejected the plaintiff’s arguments “because it found
that they had ample remedies under English law and nothing sug-
gested that English courts were biased or unfair.”221  It also noted that
the Seventh Circuit, in Bonny, and the Tenth Circuit, in Riley, had
similarly found that adequate remedies were available to their re-
spective plaintiffs after “examin[ing] English law and conclud[ing]
that the Names would be able to adequately pursue their claims in
England.”222  Repeating the arguments already made by the Second,
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit followed suit and con-
cluded simply: “The fact that parties will have to structure their cases
differently than if they were litigating in federal court is not a suffi-
cient reason to defeat a forum selection clause.”223
One year later the Fourth Circuit was pulled into the debate
when Allen v. Lloyd’s of London,224 involving the enforceability of
Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses, came before it. Following protocol,
the court began by reciting the Bremen factors.225  Although it did not
cite Roby as its source, the Allen court seemed to be using Roby’s
version of the Bremen factors.  Specifically, in the hands of the Allen
court the third factor once again changed from the Supreme Court’s
“unreasonable and unjust” to the Roby court’s “deprivation of a
219. See id. at 1230.  Specifically, Shell argued that he was entitled to a remedy based on a
“merit review” process under Ohio securities law.  Id.
220. See id. at 1231.
221. Id. at 1231.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996).
225. See id. at 928.
[T]he presumption of enforceability that forum selection and choice of law provisions
enjoy is not absolute and, therefore, may be overcome by a clear showing that they
are “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”  Choice of forum and law provisions
may be found unreasonable if (1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreach-
ing; (2) the complaining party “will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court” because of the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the
fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; (4)
their enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.
Id. (citations omitted).
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plaintiff’s remedy.”226
The Allen court easily discarded the first three Bremen factors
and proceeded to wrestle with the fourth Bremen factor—i.e., that
enforcing the COL and COF clauses would be contrary to public
policy.227  The court identified the public policy at issue as “a policy of
full disclosure of relevant information to replace the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor.”228  It further observed that U.S. securities laws prohibit
attempts to waive their disclosure requirements.229 The question, as
the court saw it, was thus “whether the choice of forum and law
clauses to which the Names agreed when entering the Lloyd’s insur-
ance market implicate the anti-fraud and disclosure policies that un-
derlie the United States securities laws to the extent that those
clauses cannot be enforced.”230
The court began to answer this question by stating that enforce-
ment of Lloyd’s clauses would not subvert the U.S. securities laws’
policy of prohibiting fraud:
British law not only prohibits fraud and misrepresentations as do
the United States securities laws, but also affords Names adequate
remedies in the United Kingdom.  Under British law, the Names
could bring claims based on the tort of deceit, breach of contract,
negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, and could obtain injunc-
tive, declaratory, rescissionary, and restitutionary relief.231
Quoting Riley, the Allen court reiterated: “[T]he fact that an interna-
tional transaction may be subject to laws and remedies different or
less favorable than those of the United States is not a valid basis to
deny enforcement.”232
Turning next to the international character of the Lloyd’s trans-
action, the court announced: “We do not believe that Congress in-
tended the disclosure requirements of the United States securities
law be exported and imposed as governing principles on markets
conducted entirely in other countries simply because membership in
such markets is solicited in the United States.”233  The court stressed
that membership solicitation, which occurred in the U.S., was
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 929.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (citations omitted).
232. Id. (quoting Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
233. Id.
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“incidental to the formation of underwriting syndicates and the man-
agement of risks,” which occurred in London.234  As such, the court
found the public policy concerns to be unpersuasive because “[t]he
United States nexus to the transactions involved in this case is thus
incidental and tangential.”235
In Scherk, the case in which the international/domestic distinc-
tion was first created, the Supreme Court also stressed the over-
whelming international quality of the contract before it.236  Unlike the
Allen court, however, the Supreme Court never claimed that the U.S.
lacked a public policy interest in that contract because of its minimal
contacts with the United States; rather, the Court assumed that such
an interest in fact did exist.237  The Court believed, however, that the
excessive “international-ness” of the Alberto-Culver/Scherk contract
interfered with the public policy of the U.S. securities laws.  It also
believed that such interference was an inevitable consequence of any
truly international contract.238  The Court found that the COL and
COP clauses in the contract before it denied the plaintiff a substan-
tive right—access to a wide choice of courts and venue—but that that
right had already disappeared the moment the plaintiff began to in-
volve itself in international commerce.239  As such, the COL and COP
clauses did not contravene public policy because the public policy, as
the Court had defined it, could not survive in an international con-
text.240
This is obviously a much different analysis than the minimal con-
tacts analysis employed by the Allen court.  In light of the fact that
the Allen court had identified a different public policy than the
Scherk court, had the Allen court employed the Scherk court’s rea-
soning, it is conceivable that it might have found that enforcing the
COL and COF clauses would have contravened that public policy.
This, of course, is only supposition.  In the end, the Allen court found
that U.S. public policy was not implicated because there were insuffi-
cient contacts with the U.S.241  Having dealt with the fourth Bremen
factor, the court invoked the deference for COF clauses in interna-
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974).
237. See id. at 515.
238. See id. at 517-18.
239. See id.
240. See id.; supra note 114 and accompanying text.
241. See Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996).
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tional contracts urged by the Supreme Court in Bremen and wrote:
“To permit the Names to escape their agreements to be bound by the
laws and rules of the British market just at a time when they face
losses would also violate the most fundamental precepts of interna-
tional law.”242  As such, the Fourth Circuit concluded that enforce-
ment of Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses “[did] not contravene or un-
dermine any policy of the United States securities laws.”243
In Richards v. Lloyd’s of London,244 the issue of Lloyd’s COL
and COF clauses came before the Ninth Circuit.  Appropriately
enough for a circuit that includes the state of California, the Richards
court proceeded to shock the establishment by doing everything dif-
ferently.  To begin, the Richards court never itemized the Bremen
factors.  Indeed, the court made a point of denying the primacy of the
Bremen factors, which it termed “a ‘reasonableness’ test.”245
The court believed that the antiwaiver provisions the U.S. securi-
ties laws unequivocally prohibited Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses
(which the court referred to collectively as “the Choice Clauses”).246
After quoting the anti-waiver provisions of both Acts, the court
stated: “The Choice Clauses operate to effect such waivers.  Accord-
ingly, under the precise terms of these two statutes, the Choice
Clauses are void.” 247  And since these clauses were de facto invalid,
there was no need to inquire into their “reasonableness.”248
The district court made an error of law in supposing that the Choice
Clauses were unenforceable only if unreasonable.  Congress had al-
ready determined that such clauses were void.  It was not for a
court to weigh their reasonableness, not for a court to say whether
they offended any policy of the United States. The policy decision
had been made by the legislature.249
In our view, however, the reasonableness of the Choice Clauses is
not determinative of their enforceability.  The Securities Acts’ an-
tiwaiver provisions themselves render the Choice Clauses void,
making it unnecessary to examine whether enforcement of the
clauses would be reasonable under the test set forth in The Bremen
and Carnival.250
242. Id. at 930.
243. Id.
244. 107 F.3d 1422, reh’g en banc granted, 121 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 1997).
245. See id. at 1428-29.
246. Id. at 1424.
247. Id. at 1426.
248. See id. at 1428-29.
249. Id. at 1426.
250. Id. at 1428-29.
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[T]he Bremen did not apply the “reasonableness” analysis in the
face of a statute purporting to decide the question of a choice-of-
forum clause’s enforceability. . . . The “unreasonableness” test does
not apply here where Congress specifically enacted antiwaiver pro-
visions in the Securities Acts.251
In the eyes of the Richards court, the presence of a statutory anti-
waiver provision precludes a Bremen factor analysis. A court should
thus first look for such a provision, and only afterwards—if it finds
that no such provision exists—should it invoke the Bremen analysis.
Addressing Scherk, which also involved an antiwaiver provision
yet nonetheless applied the Bremen analysis, the Richards court drew
two distinctions.  First, contrary to the Allen court’s findings, the
Richards court found that the contracts before it were less interna-
tional than the contract in Scherk because there were substantial con-
tacts with the U.S.252  Second, the court observed that Scherk involved
two conflicting statutes, whereas Richards involved a statute that con-
flicted with a judge-made rule.253  The court asked and answered: “Is
there a significant difference between a policy objection to enforce-
ment of the antiwaiver bars and a statutory obstacle to such enforce-
ment?  We believe there is.”254  Explaining its reasoning, the court
wrote:
Where a statute exists, a policy has been given form and focus and
precise force.  A statute represents a decision by the elected repre-
sentatives of the people as to what particular policy should prevail,
and how.  A policy objection represents judicial reasoning in the
area where the federal statutes, if they are to the contrary, must
rule.  A statutory obstacle represents a legislative determination
that is of at least equal weight with another statute.  Consequently,
what was decided when the Arbitration Act stood in the way of the
antiwaiver bars is not helpful when no statute stands in the way of
their enforcement.255
251. Id. at 1429.
252. See id. at 1427.
The fragmentary contacts with the United States of the contract in Scherk distinguish
it from the contracts here where, according to the allegations we must accept at this
state of the pleadings as true, the offerees were recruited in the United States, agents
of the offeror were paid in the United States, documents material to the contracts
were mailed in the United States, and residents of the United States invested large
sums of money and remained liable to the full extent of their assets for indefinite
amounts of money.
Id.
253. See id.  “As is apparent from the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Court in Scherk had
to decide which one of two federal statutes to apply . . . . It did not weigh reasonableness or pit
amorphous policy against a command of Congress.”  Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Scherk was thus unique because in that case the Supreme Court
was attempting to harmonize the antiwaiver provision of the U.S. se-
curities laws (requiring that the case be heard in the U.S. under U.S.
law) with the Federal Arbitration Act256 (FAA) (requiring that the
situs of arbitration agreed to in the contract be honored).  Richards,
by contrast, required the court to choose between the antiwaiver pro-
visions of the U.S. securities laws and a judicial policy requiring a
court to inquire into the reasonableness of COL and COF clauses.  In
such a case, according to the Richards court, the mandates of the
statute win hands down.
In support of this conclusion, the court turned to Footnote 19 in
Mitsubishi.257  It observed that, “[t]here is no question that the Choice
Clauses operate in tandem as a prospective waiver of the plaintiff’s
remedies under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.”258  Thus, it reasoned:
If the Supreme Court would condemn such clauses where they
work against a public policy embodied in statutes even though the
statutes themselves don’t void the clauses [the Antitrust statutes], a
fortiori the Supreme Court would condemn similar clauses when
they run in the teeth of two precise statutory provisions making
them void.259
The Richards court also perceived a second reason why the
Choice Clauses were barred by precedent: The Supreme Court, in
relying on the FAA to uphold arbitration clauses in securities cases,
had observed that while arbitration would change the procedure for
resolving controversies, arbitrators nonetheless would apply the sub-
stantive securities laws of the United States where that law was appli-
cable.260  The COL clause was only upheld in Scherk, the Richards
court pointed out, because the slight contacts with the United States
made it uncertain which law would otherwise apply.261  “The strong
implication is that where there is substantial contact with the United
States even the Arbitration Act could not authorize the waiver of the
substantive protections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.”262  Defining sub-
stantive provisions as those exemplified by “the provision in section
12(2) of the 1933 Act placing on the seller the burden of proving lack
of scienter when a buyer alleges fraud,” the Richards court con-
256. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Id.
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cluded: “[T]he Choice Clauses require the waiver of substantive pro-
visions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and are consequently void.”263
Finally, the court stated that even if it were to undertake a Bre-
men analysis, as the previous circuits had, it did not believe that ade-
quate remedies were available under English law.264  Relying on de-
terminations made by the SEC, which had entered the case on appeal
as a friend of the court, the court identified three major deficiencies
in English law:
(1) There is no remedy for failure to register securities as required
by Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act. (2) There is no remedy in Eng-
land against Lloyd’s for negligent representation as provided by
Section 12(2) . . . . (3) In the United States there is liability for con-
trolling persons under Section 15 of the 1933 Act and Section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act; there is no such liability in England.265
Believing these deficiencies to be fatal, the court concluded: “The
available English remedies are not adequate for the firm shield and
finely honed swords provided by American securities law.”266
The Richards court conceded that its decision would run counter
to the previous decisions of five other circuits.267  It discounted Riley
since the Tenth Circuit had never addressed the statutory bars and
because the issue in that case had been “clouded” by the presence of
an arbitration clause.268  Unable to dismiss the remaining cases quite
so easily, the court simply chose not to follow their reasoning:
“Although we do not lightly deviate from the conclusions of our fel-
low circuits, we are convinced that those cases improperly disregard
the statutory antiwaiver provisions of the Securities Acts.”269
Finally, in Haynsworth v. The Corporation,270 the most recent of
the Lloyd’s cases, the Fifth Circuit weighed in on Lloyd’s COL and
COF clauses.  Eschewing the Richards court’s antiestablishmentari-
anism, the Haynsworth court began its analysis quite conventionally,
by reciting the Bremen factors.271  Although the Haynsworth court
263. Id. at 1427-28.
264. See id. at 1429.
265. Id. at 1429-30.
266. Id. at 1430.
267. See id. at 1428.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997).
271. Id. at 963.
The presumption of enforceability may be overcome, however, by a clear showing
that the clause is “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”  Unreasonableness poten-
tially exists where (1) the incorporation of the forum selection clause into the agree-
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doesn’t cite Roby as a source, the Roby court’s version of the third
Bremen factor once again reappears.272
After disposing of the first Bremen factor relatively straightfor-
wardly,273 the court focused its energies on the fourth Bremen factor.
The court began by announcing that “the basic framework for ana-
lyzing the plaintiff’s . . . public policy arguments is the strong pre-
sumption of enforceability established by The Bremen and Scherk,
and the highest hurdle [the plaintiffs] must overcome to demonstrate
‘unreasonableness’ is Scherk.”274  Turning to the COL and COF
clauses at issue, the Haynsworth court was unwilling to concede that
they might operate together to “extinguish both a ‘procedural right’
and a more important ‘substantive right’ to the remedies afforded by
a particular statue or common-law cause of action.”275 Indeed, the
court denied that it was even required to inquire into implications of
the COL and COF operating in combination: “[S]urely it is obvious
that, even in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, enforcement of a
foreign forum selection clause frequently will result in the application
of foreign law to the dispute.”276  In other words, it is enough to con-
sider the COF clause alone because enforcement of it implicitly con-
tains the possibility that the foreign forum’s laws will be applied as
well.  In response to the plaintiffs’ protest that Footnote 19 in Mitsu-
bishi might suggest otherwise, the court replied: “Setting aside the
fact that it is dictum, the quoted statement, by its own terms is limited
to the antitrust context, as is Mitsubishi more generally.”277
Having ruled out the necessity of having to investigate the im-
pact of the COL and COF clauses acting together, the court’s analysis
became considerably easier.  It proclaimed: “Quite simply, Scherk
rejected the idea that the antiwaiver provisions of the U.S. securities
laws bar enforcement of forum selection clauses in international
transactions.”278  Thus, the court was left only to consider the plain-
ment was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) the party seeking to escape en-
forcement “will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court” because of
the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental un-
fairness of the chosen law will deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of
the forum selection clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.
Id.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 963-65.
274. Id. at 966.
275. Id. at 967.
276. Id. at 967.
277. Id. at 968.
278. Id. at 969.
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tiffs’ objections that the remedies available to them under English
law were inadequate.279
The court acknowledged that “[t]he American system of securi-
ties regulations may be the broadest, most comprehensive of all.”280
However, it did not believe that public policy required “that every
foreign forum’s remedies must duplicate those available under
American law.”281  In any case, the court refused to go so far as to
even grant that English law might provide less protections than U.S.
law; it would only say that English law was different from U.S. law.282
As other courts have observed English law provides a variety of
protections for fraud and misrepresentations in securities transac-
tions. . . . Indeed in some respects, English law appear to provide
even greater protections than does U.S. law.  The plaintiffs’ reme-
dies in England are adequate to protect their interests and the poli-
cies behind the statutes at issue.283
Having come to the end of its investigation, the court concluded:
“Careful weighing of these considerations leads us to join the major-
ity of courts that have considered this issue in concluding that the an-
tiwaiver provisions of U.S. securities laws do not bar enforcement of
the FS/COL clause.”284
IV.  DISCUSSION
As a general rule, the initial point of inquiry for all of the federal
circuits involved in the Lloyd’s cases has been whether Lloyd’s COL
and COF clauses violated the antiwaiver provisions of  U.S. securities
laws.  The Ninth Circuit, in Richards, found that they patently did
and was willing to end its analysis there.  The other six circuits, how-
ever, focused on the international character of Lloyd’s contracts.
They seemed to tacitly subscribe to the Supreme Court’s belief in
Scherk that the “international-ness” of a securities contract could ab
initio cause U.S. securities law to gain less of a purchase.  However,
to escape having to find that securities contracts could not exist in an
279. Id.  The court had stated that the plaintiffs had rested their arguments only on the first
and fourth Bremen factors.  See id. at 963.  This last point, however, sounds like an attempt to
satisfy the third Bremen factor.  One reading might be that the Fifth Circuit was simply using
the third Bremen factor to determine whether the fourth Bremen factor had been satisfied,
much as the Second Circuit had done in Roby.  See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
280. Id. at 969.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 969-70.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 969.
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international context because the securities laws which governed
them could not exist there, these courts hit upon the inspiration of
disassociating the public policy that undergirded the securities laws
from the laws themselves.  U.S. securities law might not reach beyond
U.S. borders, seems to be the thinking, but its public policy concerns
did.  Thus, the courts sought to determine whether the public policy
goals of U.S. securities law were being served—even if inadvertently
so—by the laws of the foreign forum.  By its very nature, such an
analysis precluded a preliminary finding that Lloyd’s clauses, on their
face, violated the antiwaiver provisions; it militated a more extensive
investigation into the laws of the foreign forum.
In any case, if Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses aren’t prima facie
invalid, then the general consensus seems to be that they should be
enforced unless one of the Bremen factors is satisfied.  Even the
Ninth Circuit offered a Bremen analysis as an alternate explanation
for its holding.  Admittedly, there is some disagreement as to how
many Bremen factors there actually are—three or four—and as to
what exactly the third Bremen factor is—the Supreme Court’s
“unreasonable and unjust,” the Second Circuit’s “deprivation of a
plaintiff’s remedy,” or the Seventh Circuit’s omission of the third
Bremen factor altogether. Appropriately, however, given the logic
which seems to have lead to the need to conduct a Bremen analysis in
the first place (i.e., the disassociation of public policy from the fed-
eral securities laws), the fourth Bremen factor (public policy) has
been the primary bone of contention upon which the courts have
gnawed.
In applying the Bremen factors, all of the courts seem to have
employed a holistic—as opposed to a linear—analysis.  That is, in-
stead of methodically testing each factor one at a time (“Is the first
factor satisfied? . . . No. . . . Is the second factor satisfied? . . . No. . . .”
and so on), the courts have typically conflated the Bremen factors,
using one factor as an indicium of another.  Thus, whether the fourth
Bremen factor had been satisfied was invariably determined by
looking to see whether the third Bremen factor had been satisfied.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, in Riley, went so far as to use the third
Bremen factor to determine whether the second Bremen factor had
been satisfied, which it in turn used to determine whether the fourth
Bremen factor had been satisfied.
What is perhaps most striking in all of this is that it never seems
to have occurred to the courts, with the possible exception of the
Ninth Circuit, that the fourth Bremen factor might have been satis-
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fied for reasons other than a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ remedies.
To put it more bluntly, had the courts employed a linear analysis,
they might have felt less constrained in their reasoning and, instead,
might have investigated all the possible ways the fourth Bremen fac-
tor could have been satisfied.  Employing a holistic analysis, however,
the courts’ logic seems to have been penned in by a parochial inabil-
ity to conceive of possibilities beyond the itemized Bremen list.  Sig-
nificantly, the Ninth Circuit, which disavowed the Bremen analysis,
and by extension its holistic methodology, was the only court to find
that while plaintiffs did have some remedies available to them under
English law, nonetheless the public policy concerns undergirding U.S.
securities law would not be served if Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses
were enforced.
V.  CONCLUSION
Seven federal circuits have now deliberated upon the implica-
tions of Lloyd’s use of COL and COF clauses in international securi-
ties contracts.  A close reading of their seven opinions makes clear
that each circuit has employed a slightly different mode of analysis—
they reached for the same tools, perhaps, but they each used those
tools in subtly different ways.  Such discrepancies, however, are be-
lied by the fact that each circuit ultimately came to the same conclu-
sion and chose to enforce Lloyd’s clauses.  Even the errant Ninth Cir-
cuit, which stood alone in holding that Lloyd’s clauses were invalid as
a violation of the antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws,
looks like it may now be preparing itself to join its sister circuits.
This apparent unanimity is misleading, however.  Because the
courts have employed different methods of analysis, it is not alto-
gether impossible that future COL and COF clauses in international
securities contracts will be received differently by the various circuits.
The Lloyd’s cases might thus be limited only to Lloyd’s use of such
clauses.  Still, a few general observations can be teased out of the
opinions of the seven circuits: (1)  The primary question to be an-
swered is whether the COL and COF clauses violate the antiwaiver
provisions of the U.S. securities laws; (2)  In an international context,
the antiwaiver provisions will be violated only if the public policy un-
dergirding the U.S. securities laws is not served by the laws of the
foreign forum; (3) Only the Bremen factors should be employed to
determine whether the laws of the foreign forum serve to protect
public policy concerns of the U.S. securities laws; (4)  Determining
whether the fourth Bremen factor (regarding the contravention of a
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strong public policy) has been satisfied should only be done by refer-
ence to the other Bremen factors.  For the moment, these seem to be
the only sure rules that govern the international securities game.
Jon A. Jacobson
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ADDENDUM
Shortly before this Note was to go to press, the Ninth Circuit de-
livered its en banc opinion in the Richards case (Richards II).285  On
February 3, 1998, in an 8-3 opinion, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its
earlier decision286 (Richards I) and held that Lloyd’s COL and COF
clauses should be enforced.287  Significantly, in coming to this conclu-
sion the court eschewed the linear analysis of the Bremen factors that
it had previously employed and reverted to the holistic analysis
unanimously relied upon by its sister circuits.288
In Richards I, the court had side-stepped the Bremen factors by
proclaiming them a “reasonableness test” to be applied only if the
COL and COF clauses were not prima facie void.289  It distinguished
Bremen by pointing out that in that case the Supreme Court “did not
apply the ‘reasonableness’ analysis in the face of a statute purporting
to decide the question of a choice-of-forum clauses enforceability.”290
The instant case was different, the Richards I court reasoned, because
Congress had already determined that Lloyd’s use of such clauses
was void when it enacted the antiwaiver provisions of the securities
laws.291  As such, inquiring into their “reasonableness” would be a
pointless endeavor, and the Bremen factors need not be applied. 292
The Richards II court, however, refused to distinguish Bremen in
this way.293  It argued that while Bremen may not have involved a
COF clause that conflicted with a statute, the Supreme Court had
nonetheless contemplated such a situation in its opinion.294  It quoted
the Supreme Court: “A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be
held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
285. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, Nos. 95-55747, 95-56467, 1998 WL 39231 (9th Cir.
Feb. 3, 1998).
286. See Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 107 F.3d 1422, reh’g en banc granted, 121 F.3d 565
(9th Cir. 1997); supra notes 244-66 and accompanying text.
287. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *1.
288. See supra notes 244-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s previous
analysis of the Bremen factors); discussion supra Part IV (describing linear and holistic analyses
of the Bremen factors).
289. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
293. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *2.
294. See id. at *3.
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statute or by judicial decision.”295  Thus, the Richards II court be-
lieved that it was justified now in applying the Bremen factors to the
case before it.  Significantly, however, the court seems to have over-
looked the fact that this statement had been made in the context of
describing but one of the factors of the Bremen analysis in isolation—
specifically, the fourth factor.296  The Supreme Court likely did not in-
tend for its remarks to be stretched to cover, as the Richards II court
would like to, the Bremen analysis in toto.
To further support its application of the Bremen factors, the
Richards II court pointed out that the Supreme Court itself had ex-
plicitly relied on Bremen in its analysis in Scherk—a case which in-
volved a securities transaction and thus was analogous to Richards.297
The Richards I court had previously discounted Scherk by arguing
that that case was unique in that it involved two competing statutes—
the antiwaiver provisions of the U.S. securities laws (requiring that
the case be heard in the United States and under U.S. law) and the
FAA (requiring that the situs of arbitration agreed to in the contract
be honored).298  In the case at bar, the Richards I court pointed out,
the court was being asked to choose between the antiwaiver provi-
sions of the U.S. securities laws and a judicial policy requiring a court
to inquire into the reasonableness of COL and COF clauses.299  This
distinction made Scherk inapposite, and the difference was fatal.300
The Richards II court, however, denied the significance of the
Richards I court’s judge-law/statutory-law distinction; or, at the very
least, the Richards II court refused to be bound by such a distinction
without taking into account any number of other considerations.
Indeed, were we to find that Bremen did not apply, the reach of
United States securities laws would be unbounded.  The Names
simply prove too much when they assert that “Bremen’s judicially-
created policy analysis under federal common law is not controlling
when Congress has expressed its will in a statute.” This assertion, if
true, expands the reach of federal securities law to any and all such
transactions, no matter how remote from the United States.  We
agree with the Fifth Circuit that “we must tread cautiously before
expanding the operation of U.S. securities laws in the international
295. Id. (quoting The Bremen v. Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)); see supra note 89
and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
297. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *3.
298. See supra notes 253-53 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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arena.”301
The Richards I court had refused to inquire into the reasonable-
ness of Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses because it believed that Con-
gress had already declared such clauses unreasonable when it enacted
the antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws.302 Every other
court had previously operated on the unspoken assumption that a
Bremen analysis could be undertaken at any time, that the “moment”
for a Bremen analysis—the Bremen moment, if you will—came into
existence the instant a COL or COF clause was drafted and contin-
ued to exist indefinitely. Thus, the Richards I court’s inspiration was
that by identifying a point in time that was post-drafting yet pre-
Bremen analysis—a pre-Bremen moment—and by interposing itself
at that point, it was able to stop the Bremen analysis before it could
begin.
The Richards II court, it would seem, was now attempting to
one-up the Richards I court by identifying yet an even earlier point in
time—a pre-pre-Bremen moment—and interposing itself there in or-
der to ambush the Richards I court’s pre-Bremen moment attack on
the necessity of a Bremen analysis.  The manner in which the Rich-
ards II court sought to accomplish this, however, is disturbingly awk-
ward: in effect, the Richards II court proposed to inquire into the rea-
sonableness of inquiring into the reasonableness of Lloyd’s clauses.303
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of the tortured way in which the court
sought to circumvent the Richard I court’s logic, the Richards II court
ultimately found that it would in fact be unreasonable not to inquire
into the reasonableness of the clauses because not to do so would
leave the U.S. securities laws “unbounded.”304
If one follows the reasoning of the Richards II court, a court
faced with a COL or COF clause must now ask the following ques-
tions in the following order: (1) Would it be unreasonable not to ap-
ply a Bremen analysis? (2) Do the clauses violate any statute thereby
rendering them de facto unreasonable and obviating the need for a
Bremen analysis? (3) Are any of the Bremen factors satisfied?  Hav-
ing asked the first question and having answered it in the affirmative
in the context of international securities contracts, the Richards II
court effectively emasculated the Richards I court’s logic by bypass-
ing the second question and reasserting the necessity of a Bremen
301. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *3.
302. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
304. Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *3; supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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analysis.  Regardless of whether a COL or COF clause violates the
antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws, it would none-
theless be unreasonable for a court not to apply a Bremen analysis to
determine the enforceability of such clauses.
Having worked its way through this tricky game of logic, the
Richards II court, in stark contradistinction to the renegade Richards
I court, was thus able to begin it analysis conventionally by formally
enumerating the Bremen factors.305  As the Seventh Circuit had done
previously,306 however, the Richards II court identified only three
Bremen factors with which to contend; the third Bremen factor identi-
fied by the Supreme Court (if enforcement would be “unreasonable
and unjust”) was inexplicably omitted.  The Names argued that
Lloyd’s clauses satisfied the first (fraud) and fourth (public policy)
Bremen factors.307  The court, however, easily disposed of the first fac-
tor.308
Left with only the fourth Bremen factor with which to contend,
the court acknowledged: “The Names’ strongest argument for es-
caping their agreement to litigate their claims in England is that the
choice clauses contravene a strong public policy embodied in federal
and state securities laws and RICO.”309  No sooner had the court ad-
mitted this, however, than did it seek to undermine this argument by
recurring to Scherk and invoking the unique exception of
“international-ness.”310  In effect, the Richards II court argued that
the contract signed by the Names was an international contract; and,
therefore, according to the Supreme Court’s the holding in Scherk, it
was a special case in which the COL and COF clauses must be en-
forced for the sake of international trade and commerce.311
The court responded to the Names invocation of Mitsubishi’s
Footnote 19 in two ways.312 First, similar to the approach taken by the
305. See id. at *4.
The Supreme Court has identified three grounds for repudiating a forum selection
clause: first, if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or
overreaching; second, if the party wishing to repudiate the clause would effectively be
deprived of his day in court were the clause enforced; and third, “if enforcement
would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.”
Id.
306. See supra notes 206-05 and accompanying text.
307. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *4.
308. See id. at *7-8.
309. Id. at *4.
310. See id. at *5-6; supra notes 114-14 and accompanying text.
311. See Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at* 5-6.
312. See id. at *6.
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Haynsworth court,313 it sought to proscribe the footnote as nothing
more than mere dictum limited to the Antitrust context: “[W]e do
not believe dictum in a footnote regarding antitrust laws outweighs
the extended discussion and holding in Scherk on the validity of
clauses specifying the forum and applicable law.”314  Thus, where the
Richards I court had found Footnote 19 to be all the more persuasive
for being stated in the context of Antitrust laws which do not explic-
itly void COL and COF clauses,315 the Richards II court took the an-
tipodal position and considered this to be its fatal flaw.  Second, the
Richards II court argued that in Scherk the Supreme Court had al-
lowed for the use of COL clauses without ever suggesting that they
might impair the validity of COF clauses: “The Supreme Court re-
peatedly recognized in Scherk that parties to an international securi-
ties transaction may choose law other than that of the United States,
yet it never suggested that this affected the validity of a forum selec-
tion clause.”316  Aside from the obvious counter argument that the
Supreme Court never suggested that such clauses didn’t affect the
validity of forum selection clauses, this second point is seriously un-
dermined by the fact that, as the dissent in Richards II pointed out,
“to the extend that the Scherk Court speculated about the enforce-
ability of a contractual provision selecting foreign law, such a discus-
sion was dictum.  As such, it warrants no greater deference than
footnote 19 of Mitsubishi.”317
Finally, just as the appellate courts of the other six circuits had
previously done, the Richards II court resorted to a holistic analysis
of the Bremen factors—that is, it used one Bremen factor as a yard-
stick to determine whether another Bremen factor has been satis-
fied.318 Specifically, the court attempted to determine whether the
fourth Bremen factor (public policy) had been satisfied by determin-
ing whether the third Bremen factor (deprivation of a remedy) had
been satisfied.319
We follow our six sister circuits that have ruled to enforce the
choice clauses.  We do so because we apply Scherk and because
English law provides the Names with sufficient protection.320
313. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
314. Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *6.
315. See supra notes 257-56 and accompanying text.
316. Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *6 (citations omitted).
317. Id. at *12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
318. See id. at *7.
319. See id.
320. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
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Of course, were English law so deficient that the Names would be
deprived of any reasonable recourse, we would have to subject the
choice clauses to another level of scrutiny.321
The perverse thing about the Richards II court’s holistic analysis
is that the Richards II court never recognized the third Bremen fac-
tor.322  To be sure, it identified the first (fraud), second (deprivation of
plaintiff’s day in court) and fourth Bremen factors (public policy), but
never the third Bremen factor (deprivation of a remedy).323  And to
further confound things, the Richards II court chose as its yardstick
not the Supreme Court’s third Bremen factor (“unreasonable and
unjust”), but the Roby court’s third Bremen factor (deprivation of a
remedy).324
The Richards II court never explains how it settled upon this
manner of holistic analysis.  One can only assume that it chose this
formulation in response to the Richards I court’s contention that,
were it to employ a Bremen analysis, Lloyd’s clauses would nonethe-
less fail in light of the remedies available under English law.325  The
Richards I court, however, had had the advantage of nowhere enu-
merating the Bremen factors; the Richards II court did not have that
luxury and its analysis seems the weaker for its contradictions.  Unde-
terred, or perhaps unaware, the Richards II court concluded that
there are adequate remedies under English law.
We disagree with the dramatic assertion that “[t]he available Eng-
lish remedies are not adequate substitutes for the firm shields and
finely honed swords provided by American securities.”326
While it is true that the Lloyd’s Act immunizes Lloyd’s from many
actions possible under our securities laws, Lloyd’s is not immune
from the consequences of actions committed in bad faith, including
fraud . . . . [W]e have been cited no authority that Lloyd’s partial
immunity would bar recovery.327
As such, the Richards II court concluded that the third Bremen factor
was not satisfied, which in turn meant that the fourth Bremen factor
was not satisfied and, ultimately, that Lloyd’s clauses should be en-
forced.
The decision in Richards II effectively closes the circle by mak-
321. Id. at *7.
322. See supra notes 305-03 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 305-03 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 264-63 and accompanying text.
326. Richards, 1998 WL 39231, at *7.
327.Id.
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ing it unanimous—all seven circuits confronted with the issue have
now chosen to enforce Lloyd’s COL and COF clauses.  At the same
time, however, a close reading of the court’s analysis in Richards II
gives one the uncomfortable impression that, like an arctic glacier,
beneath this smooth surface of consensus there lurk profound and
treacherous faults.  Certainly, it remains not entirely inconceivable
that another COL and COF clause in another international securities
contract might be analyzed in the same manner and yet be enforced
differently.  That said, perhaps the most optimistic conclusion that
can be safely drawn from Richards II is that it confirms the four gen-
eral observations listed above: (1) The primary question is whether
the antiwaiver provisions of the U.S. securities laws are being vio-
lated; (2) In an international context, the antiwaiver provisions will
be violated only if the public policy undergirding the U.S. securities
laws is not served by the laws of the foreign forum; (3) Only the Bre-
men factors should be used to determine whether the laws of the for-
eign forum serve to protect public policy concerns of the U.S. securi-
ties laws; (4) Whether the fourth Bremen factor (public policy) has
been satisfied should only be determined by reference to the other
three Bremen factors.  The score may have changed, but the rules of
the game remain the same.
